

During my work in the Russian Archive for the Economy (RGAE) I found a rather remarkable correspondence: A back and forth between American MIT management Professor, Carroll Wilson, and the Soviet deputy director of the State Commission for Science and Technology (GKNT), Djerman Gvishiani about a joint article on protein deficiency and international economic development that they planned to publish in *Scientific American*. This correspondence on Soviet-American cooperation in the field of “development planning” sent me on a chase for documents that transformed my dissertation project on the role of the “Cold War” paradigm in Soviet economic thinking and reform into something else: Looking at planning as a paradigm for economic development that united economic theorists on both sides of the Iron Curtain in a search for a mathematically driven, ideologically neutral approach to administering the economy. This revelation led me to develop the argument that by the late-1970s, the “Cold War Paradigm of Soviet economic created by Khrushchev which set the end goal of the Soviet economy was to lay the road to “Communism” by “catching up and overtaking the United States” in output to one which saw the USSR as interconnected to issues being faced by the issues of postindustrial society shared by both advanced societies. As such, I argue that the USSR’s intellectual elites did not become “liberal” reformers but began to accept a multilateral approach to international political economy.

As part of this research, I looked into the institutions that these theorists constructed to advance a multilateral vision of a planned economy. My dissertation traces how the United Nations and its expert commissions like the Advisory Commission on Scientific Transfer (ACAST), the Committee on Development Planning as well as working groups of the OECD and COMECON became incubators for a wider network of institutions dedicated to what would be known as “the new planning”—most prominently the Club of Rome and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. I argue that Soviet participation—through the efforts of Gvishiani— was not vital to the establishment of these networks. Furthermore, I document how participation in these organizations changed the way that social science in the USSR was run. The multidisciplinary approach taken by “new planners” and “systems theorists” allowed for Gvishiani and his contemporaries to lobby for the establishment for a new type of institute that was outside the control of the usual academic hierarchy of the Academy of Sciences so as to more effectively networks with IIASA and transfer the latest advances of international planning science to the USSR’s domestic economy. This institute founded in 1976, known as the All Union Scientific Research Institute for Systems Analysis (VSNIIISI), became not only a leading center for the development and analysis of domestic economic policy but an incubator for many members of the Post-Soviet elite including Yegor Gaidar, Boris Berezovsky, and Petr Avin.

As part of this research, I used funds provided to me by the Joint Center for History and Economics/ “The History Project” and the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) to conduct research in the archives of IIASA in Laxemburg, Austria. This work allowed me to understand the exact dimensions of knowledge transfer from the international scientific community to domestic development projects in the USSR as well as the composition of the Soviet delegations to the institute. The archives of IIASA are unprocessed and only now being reassembled by its hardworking staff. However, despite this, they are valuable not only for understanding the precise dimensions of cooperation between the USSR and the international scientific sphere but the larger problems of international political economy that they were embedded in. For example, I have used the IIASA archives to illustrate how mathematical models of regional energy development created in the USSR and then perfected using Western data were vital for the way in which the Baikal Amur Railway (BAM) project was designed and how that infamous folly was actually a response to the larger energy problem that was faced by advanced economies in the 1970s and early 1980s. This is rather important for understanding Soviet economic thinking as popular conceptions of the period often see the USSR as a closed society that was not touched by the “shock of the global” that historians have been now labeled the “long 1970s.”

As well, working in Laxemburg has inspired me to look at the larger debate about economic planning and how its proponents in the West responded to an increasingly globalized world which limited the power of sovereigns to influence key rates in their domestic economies. I am in the process of using documents I have acquired at IIASA to prepare a series of articles on the interaction of econometrics, planning, and financial globalization. The first of these will be on IIASA as a central site for an attempt to create a neo-classical response to financial globalization that would move the economic planning models of post-1945 Europe and the developing world to a global level. The second will be a story about the reception of Wassily Leontief’s 1977 UN report, *The Future of the World Economy*, and its attendant input-output model. It will show how concerns about debt and monetary economics eclipsed Leontief’s “real side” concerns with growth and led to the hegemony and its evolution into UN’s Project LINK designed by Laurence Klein and Stanislav Menshikov. I hope to use these articles as a base for a second, post-

dissertation project on the global history of economic planning and its interaction with globalization from the 1920s to the 1980s.

The work I have described above will be published during my post-doctoral appointment at the History and Policy Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School's Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation. My article on Soviet involvement in global networks of economic planning is under review in *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*. I am also producing an article on Soviet economic thinking for *History of Political Economy*. I intend to publish the stand alone IIASA based papers in either *Review of International Political Economy* or *Humanity*. As well, I will be revising my dissertation into a full-length academic monograph and preparing an article on contextualizing the Soviet collapse and post-Soviet politics into the larger history of post-industrialism for *The American Historical Review*.